Start Xxx girl young in ottawa chat by telephone number

Xxx girl young in ottawa chat by telephone number

We have also carefully perused their written submissions. Prerna Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that Saketh lays down the correct law. Act is a special statute and it does not expressly bar the applicability of the Limitation Act. However, the word ‘of’ is different and needs to be interpreted to include the starting day of the commencement of the prescribed period.

The complainant sent a notice to the accused by fax on 11/6/1996. 12/6/1996 the complainant also sent the same notice by registered post which was served on the accused on 25/6/1996. Cognizance of the offence was taken and process was issued.

On 8/8/1996 the complainant filed a complaint under Section 138 of the N. Process was quashed by the Magistrate on the grounds urged by the accused. The High Court set aside the Magistrate’s order and restored the complaint. The only point which was urged before this Court was that the Magistrate could not have taken cognizance of the offence after the expiry of 30 days from the date of cause of action. This Court held that the notice envisaged in clause (b) of the proviso to Section 138 transmitted by fax would be in compliance with the legal requirement.

There was no dispute about the fact that notice sent by fax was received by the complainant on the same date i.e. This Court observed that as per clause (c) of Section 138, starting point of period for making payment is the date of receipt of the notice.

‘15/10/1995’ has to be included in the period of limitation and thus the complaint was barred by time. Referring to several English decisions on the point, this Court observed that the principle of excluding the day from which the period is to be reckoned is incorporated in Section 12(1) and (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. Pradeshiya Industrial & Investment Corporation of U. Section 138(b) provides that the payee must make a demand of the amount due to him within 30 days of the receipt of information from the bank.

The accused, therefore, filed petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“the Code”) for quashing the process issued by the learned Magistrate. This Court observed that this principle is also incorporated in Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Section 138(c) uses the words ‘within 15 days of the receipt of notice’.

This Court further observed that there is no reason for not adopting the rule enunciated in Haru Das Gupta, which is consistently followed and which is adopted in the General Clauses Act and the Limitation Act. Using two different words ‘from’ and ‘of’ in the same Section at different places clarifies the intention of the legislature to convey different meanings by the said words.

Counsel submitted that in view of the above, it is evident that Saketh does not lay down the correct law.